A recent bankruptcy New York court decision1 highlights a less commonly used option for lenders to take control of troubled real estate projects. The lender obtained relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on membership interests pledged to secure its mezzanine loan instead of foreclosing on its mortgage against the underlying real property.  

Here is the case, and what lenders can learn from it.  

The Case

A company facing a rash of tort lawsuits may try to use a dormant subsidiary’s bankruptcy as a tool to limit its exposure. That’s what Pfizer tried to do, and a New York bankruptcy judge sent them packing. This case is a warning to corporate parents that courts will not allow them to manipulate the process to use the bankruptcies of subsidiaries to further their own agendas. If you’re a creditor you can use this case as ammunition in reorganization disputes to show bad faith. Read on for a quick summary of what happened in the Pfizer case, and what you can learn from it.  

Introduction: Earlier this year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC[1] sent shockwaves through the secured lending community. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that a debtor can confirm a plan of reorganization while denying the secured creditor the opportunity to credit bid for its collateral if the plan provides the lender with the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim.

A recent decision may provide important ammunition to Madoff investors against "clawback" actions brought by the SIPC Trustee overseeing the Madoff bankruptcy estate (the "Madoff Trustee").1 The Madoff Trustee alleges that investors who withdrew monies from their accounts fraudulently transferred estate property under state and federal law, regardless of whether they lost more than they withdrew.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' February 7, 2011 decision, which reversed the confirmation of a plan of reorganization for DBSD North America, Inc. ("DBSD")1 is likely to have an impact nationwide.

A New York bankruptcy judge has refused to permit a debtor to use rents generated by its real property because the rents absolutely assigned to the lender pre-petition were not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.2 Before the bankruptcy filing, the lender sent the borrower a default notice and terminated the borrower's license to collect rents. The lender also directed tenants to pay rents to it and not the borrower, commenced a foreclosure action, and sought appointment of a receiver.

Reversing the bankruptcy court, a Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that a debtor in a single asset real estate case did not provide adequate protection to a creditor by providing replacement liens in the rents where there was no equity cushion.4 The notion that granting the lender a lien on future rents to replace the expenditure of prior months' rents was rejected. Accordingly, the appellate panel held that the debtor could not use rents collected post-petition to pay ordinary administrative expenses, such as fees of its professionals.

It is commonly known that a borrower's agreement with a third party not to file a bankruptcy case is unenforceable due to public policy considerations. Accordingly, lenders have searched for ways to make it difficult or painful for their borrowers to file for bankruptcy, such as imposing the requirement that prior authorization of an independent director or member be a prerequisite to a bankruptcy filing by the borrower, or requiring the borrower's principal to execute a non-recourse carve-out guaranty that would impose personal liability should the borrower file for bankruptcy.

Representing a mortgagee holding liens on 37 unsold condominium units, Herrick, Feinstein successfully blocked a debtor's effort to confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization via cramdown. The plan envisioned sales of 27 unsold units over five years, deferred payments to the mortgagee at the rate of 4.75%, and scheduled principal pay downs from the sale of units.

A Delaware bankruptcy judge recently held that a landlord's right of first refusal to purchase a debtor/tenant's liquor license (the "Option") was unenforceable since the debtor rejected the lease containing the Option1. Disagreeing with a ruling of the First Circuit Court of Appeals2, the Delaware court held that the Option provision was a non-severable part of an executory contract that was not subject to specific performance.

The Facts